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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, the jury found Roman Robert Hamann guilty of felony possession
of stolen property.   The district  court  imposed a unified sentence of ten years,  with three years
fixed.  The district court also ordered restitution to the victim and her insurance company.  On
appeal, Mr. Hamann asserts the district court abused its discretion when it ordered restitution,
because the State failed to support its requests for restitution with sufficient evidence.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
During Mr. Hamann’s jury trial, Wendie Peterson testified she had purchased a 2007
Lexus for $20,000.00.  (Tr., p.97, L.5 – p.98, L.25.)1  One morning, she noticed the Lexus was
missing from her garage in Salmon.  (See Tr.,  p.99,  Ls.7-20.)   Two  days  after  Ms.  Peterson
notified the police the Lexus had been stolen, she learned it had been recovered.  (Tr., p.99, L.21
– p.100, L.13.)
Ms. Peterson testified that the Lexus was in “perfect condition” before it went missing.
(See Tr.,  p.98,  Ls.12-16.)   When  law  enforcement  returned  the  Lexus  to  her,  it  was  “in  good
condition.”  (Tr., p.100, L.17 – p.101, L.3.)  She testified, “[t]he only thing that I found that I was
worried about was that I didn’t know who had driven it or how they drove my vehicle.”
(Tr., p.101, Ls.3-5.)  Ms. Peterson “had it totally inspected just to make sure everything was
okay.  The only other thing that I found was there was sunflower seeds everywhere in my car.”
(Tr., 2016, p.101, Ls.8-10.)  The towing company that dropped off the Lexus returned the
original keys to her.  (Tr., p.101, Ls.11-19.)
1 All citations to “Tr.” refer to the 202-page volume of the transcripts, which includes the
transcripts from the August 17, 2016 jury trial, and the October 17, 2016 sentencing hearing.
2Angela Heggenberger testified that she was driving with Mr. Hamann through Salmon
when they went into an open garage and saw the car there had keys inside.  (See Tr., p.104, L.3 –
p.105, L.20.)  She testified Mr. Hamann got into the car and drove off with it.  (See Tr., p.105,
L.21 – p.106, L.7.)  Ms. Heggenberger was driving another vehicle, and they headed to Kellogg.
(Tr., p.106, Ls.8-12.)  At one point, she abandoned the vehicle she had been driving and got in
the Lexus Mr. Hamann was driving.  (Tr., p.106, Ls.13-22.)
Ms. Heggenberger testified that she and Mr. Hamann argued after they arrived in
Kellogg, and he left her at a gas station.  (See Tr., p.107, L.6 – p.108, L.8.)  She testified that she
called her mother, who had the gas station attendant call the police.  (Tr., p.108, Ls.9-17.)  The
police asked Ms. Heggenberger what had happened and where they could find Mr. Hamann, and
she ultimately told the police they could possibly find him at his friend’s house.  (See Tr., p.108,
L.17 – p.110, L.3.)
Kellogg Police Department Officer Jake Delaney testified Ms. Heggenberger eventually
told him Mr. Hamann may be in a 2007 Lexus, and could be at a residence in Wardner.  (See
Tr., p.115, L.10 – p.117, L.17.)  At the residence, Officer Delaney found the Lexus in the
driveway.  (See Tr., p.118, Ls.5-10.)  He contacted the occupants of the residence, and they told
him Mr. Hamann had been there but had apparently left out the back.  (See Tr., p.121, Ls.10-24.)
Officer Delaney testified he and other officers went to the backyard, but did not see any
footprints in the snow leaving the residence or other evidence Mr. Hamann had left.  (Tr., p.121,
L.25 – p.122, L.20.)  The officers returned to the residence and asked permission to search for
Mr. Hamann.  (Tr., p.122, L.21 – p.123, L.8.)  Officer Delaney testified he found Mr. Hamann in
an upstairs crawl space, and arrested him.  (Tr., p.123, L.9 – p.124, L.22.)
3Pinehurst Police Department Officer William Eddy testified he had assisted
Officer Delaney.  (Tr., p.130, L.19 – p.131, L.17.)  He testified he found a set of keys in the
crawl space.  (Tr., p.132, L.21 – p.133, L.12.)  He gave the keys to Officer Delaney.  (See
Tr., p.133, Ls.23-25.)  Officer Delaney testified he used the keys to gain access to the vehicle,
and then gave the keys to the towing company.  (Tr., p.135, L.20 – p.136, L.4.)
The  State  charged  Mr.  Hamann  by  Information  with  one  count  of  possession  of  stolen
property, felony, I.C. §§ 18-2403(4) and 18-2407(1).  (R., pp.56-57.)  Mr. Hamann entered a not
guilty plea.  (R., p.58.)
The case proceeded to a jury trial.  (See R., pp.110-17.)  The jury found Mr. Hamann
guilty of possession of stolen property.  (R., p.118.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended the district court impose a unified
sentence of seven years, with three-and-one-half years fixed, to be served consecutively to “any
other sentence that the defendant may receive in other jurisdictions.”2  (Tr., p.189, L.10 – p.190,
L.1.)  Mr. Hamann recommended the district court retain jurisdiction, considering he had not
been placed on a period of retained jurisdiction before.  (See Tr., p.191, L.12 – p.195, L.3.)  The
district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, to be served
concurrently with Mr. Hamann’s other sentences.  (See R., pp.125-31.)
After the jury found Mr. Hamann guilty, the State filed a Memorandum of Restitution,
“advis[ing] the Court that restitution in this case” was $1700.26 to State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) and $316.83 to Ms. Peterson, for a total of
$2017.09.  (See R., pp.120-21.)  In support of the requests for restitution, the State attached a
2 According to Mr. Hamann’s counsel, Mr. Hamann had a pending new charge and probation
violation cases in Bannock County.  (See Tr., p.192, Ls.3-4.)
4letter from State Farm, indicating the insurance company had made $1700.26 in claim payments
to Ms. Peterson, and that Ms. Peterson had a $100.00 deductible.  (R., p.122.)  The letter stated,
“[s]hould  the  Defendant(s)  be  found  guilty,  State  Farm®  is  requesting  restitution  from  the
Defendant(s) for the damages sustained by our insured to the extent we have made claim
payments.”  (R., p.122.)
The State also attached an invoice from Salmon River/Quality Motors to Ms. Peterson for
$216.83.  (R., p.123.)  The invoice listed, as the “Correction” made, “erased all keys and
programme[d] new keys/FOB’s.  [O]perate to verify.”  (R., p.123.)  However, the
“Year/Make/Model” listed on the invoice was a “2013 DODGE R1500.”  (R., p.123.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State reiterated its requests for restitution.  (Tr., p.190,
Ls.5-8.)  Mr. Hamann’s counsel told the district court, “[i]f you remember the trial in this matter,
there was a Lexus, there was a fob, and I know those are kind of expensive.  I thought both were
returned.  And the owner of the vehicle said it was basically unharmed.  The actual—the fob was
even returned.”  (Tr., p.190, Ls.17-22.)  Defense counsel asked the district court to “keep
restitution open until we can get some more information from State Farm why there’s a
17 hundred dollar fee and why they are claiming that there is a hundred—well, basically a
$260.00 fee for the fob.”  (Tr., p.190, L.22 – p.191, L.1.)  Mr. Hamann’s counsel stated,
“[m]aybe it could be that that is in evidence right now because it was a piece of evidence in our
trial that that fob from the Lexus.  So I would just ask that you not impose restitution today until
we get some more information there.”  (Tr., p.191, Ls.1-6.)
The district court determined, “I am going to order restitution in the amounts claimed
here and a Judgment will be entered in those amounts in the total amount of $2,017.09.”
(Tr., p.199, Ls.17-20.)  The district court stated, “I reviewed the supporting materials and it
5appears that the out-of-pocket costs and the insurance costs were reasonable, in light of the
restitution claimed and I will go ahead and enter a Civil Judgment in that amount in favor of the
named victims.”  (Tr., p.199, Ls.21-25.)  Thus, the district court entered a Civil Judgment and
Order of Restitution for $316.83 to Ms. Peterson, and a Civil Judgment and Order of Restitution
for $1700.26 to State Farm.  (R., pp.131-34.)
Mr.  Hamann  filed  a  Notice  of  Appeal  timely  from  the  district  court’s  Judgment  and
Sentence.  (R., pp.135-38; see R., pp.148-52 (Amended Notice of Appeal).)
6ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered restitution, because the State failed to
support its requests for restitution with sufficient evidence?
7ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Restitution, Because The State Failed
To Support Its Requests For Restitution With Sufficient Evidence
A. Introduction
Mr. Hamann asserts the district court abused its discretion when it ordered restitution,
because the State failed to support its requests for restitution with sufficient evidence.  By asking
the district court to not award restitution until the State provided more information, Mr. Hamann
essentially asserted the evidence was insufficient to support the State’s requests for restitution.
(See Tr., p.190, L.15 – p.191, L.6.)  The State did not prove Mr. Hamann’s conduct caused the
economic losses allegedly incurred by Ms. Peterson and State Farm.
B. Standard Of Review
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that whether to order restitution, and in what amount,
is within the district court’s discretion and is guided by consideration of the factors set forth in
I.C. § 19-5304(7). State v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916, 919 (2017) (citing State v. Corbus, 150
Idaho 599, 602 (2011)).  When determining whether a district court abused its discretion, an
appellate court evaluates whether the district court:  (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with relevant
legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. (citing Swallow v.
Emergency Med. of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 592 (2003)).  The Wisdom Court held, “[t]he
second  and  third  requirements  of  that  inquiry  require  the  district  court  to  base  the  restitution
award on the preponderance of evidence submitted by the prosecutor, defendant, victim or
presentence investigator.” Id. (citing I.C. § 19-5304(6)).
8The Wisdom Court also held, “[w]hat amount of restitution to award is a question of fact
for the district court, whose findings will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.”
Id. (citing Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602).  “Substantial evidence is ‘relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882,
885 (2013)).
C. The State Failed To Present Sufficient Evidence To Support The Request For Restitution
On Behalf Of Ms. Peterson
The  State  failed  to  present  sufficient  evidence  to  support  the  request  for  restitution  on
behalf of Ms. Peterson.  Specifically, the State did not prove Mr. Hamann’s conduct caused the
economic losses allegedly incurred by Ms. Peterson.
Idaho Code § 19-5304, Idaho’s restitution statute, permits a court to order restitution for
“any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim.”  I.C. § 19-5304(2).  Section 19-5304
defines victim as meaning “a person or entity, who suffers economic loss or injury as the result
of the defendant’s criminal conduct.”  I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(i).  The term economic loss
“includes, but is not limited to, the value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise
harmed, lost wages, and direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses, such as medical expenses
resulting from the criminal conduct, but does not include less tangible damage such as pain and
suffering, wrongful death or emotional distress.”  I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a).  Thus, the Idaho Supreme
Court has held, “in order for restitution to be appropriate, there must be a causal connection
between the conduct for which the defendant is convicted and the injuries suffered by the
victim.” Wisdom, 161 Idaho at 921 (quoting Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602).
Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has held, “causation under section 19-5304 rests on tort
law principles.” Id. (citing State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374 (2009)).  Causation consists of
9actual cause and true proximate cause. Id. (quoting Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602).  “With actual
cause, the inquiry centers factually on whether a particular event produced a particular
consequence.” Id.  “Proximate cause is established if the injury is a reasonably foreseeable
result.” Id.
1. The State Did Not Prove Mr. Hamann’s Conduct Caused The Economic Loss
Encompassed By The State Farm Deductible
Here, it appears $100.00 of the $316.83 in restitution the State requested on behalf of
Ms. Peterson was for her $100.00 State Farm deductible.  (See R., pp.120, 122.)  However, the
evidence presented by the State did not establish that Mr. Hamann’s conduct had actually or
proximately caused the economic loss for which Ms. Peterson had paid the deductible.  As
Mr. Hamann’s counsel noted at the sentencing hearing, Ms. Peterson stated the Lexus “was
basically returned unharmed.”  (See Tr., p.190, Ls.17-21.)  Indeed, Ms. Peterson testified at trial
the Lexus had been returned to her “in good condition,” and she “had it totally inspected just to
make sure that everything was okay.”  (Tr., p.101, Ls.3-8.)  She had been worried about not
knowing who had driven the Lexus or how they drove it, but stated “[t]he only other thing that I
found was that there was sunflower seeds everywhere in my car.”  (Tr., p.101, Ls.3-10.)
In light of Ms. Peterson’s trial testimony that the Lexus was in good condition upon its
return to her, the State failed to show the Lexus had suffered the approximately $1800.00 in
damage (see R., p.122), from which the deductible stemmed.  Without explaining what this
damage  was,  the  State  also  failed  to  show the  economic  loss  it  encapsulated  was  the  result  of
Mr. Hamann’s conduct. See I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(i) & (2).  Thus, there was insufficient evidence
of a causal connection between Mr. Hamann’s conduct and Ms. Peterson’s deductible. See
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Wisdom, 161 Idaho at 921; Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602.  The State did not prove Mr. Hamann’s
conduct caused the economic loss encompassed by the deductible.
2. The State Did Not Prove Mr. Hamann’s Conduct Caused The Economic Loss
Encompassed By The Salmon River/Quality Motors Invoice
The State also did not prove Mr. Hamann’s conduct caused the remaining $216.83
requested on behalf of Ms. Peterson—the economic loss encompassed by the Salmon
River/Quality Motors invoice.  That amount was apparently for erasing and programming new
key  fobs.   (See R., p.123.)  During the sentencing hearing, Mr. Hamann’s counsel questioned
why there was a fee for the fob, when the fob for the Lexus had been returned.  (See Tr., p.190,
L.21 – p.191, L.1.)  In fact, the invoice reflects the work erasing keys and programming new key
fobs was not for the 2007 Lexus at issue here, but for a 2013 Dodge.3  (See R., p.123.)
Considering the evidence presented by the State indicates the $216.83 in the invoice was
not  for  work  done  on  the  Lexus,  it  cannot  be  said  this  economic  loss  was  the  result  of
Mr. Hamann’s conduct. See I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(i) & (2).  Thus, there was insufficient evidence
of a causal connection between Mr. Hamann’s conduct and the invoice. See Wisdom, 161 Idaho
at 921; Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602.  The State failed to prove Mr. Hamann’s conduct regarding the
Lexus caused Ms. Peterson to have work done on a separate vehicle unrelated to the instant case.
Even if Ms. Peterson had the work done on the 2013 Dodge to protect that vehicle from
possible theft in the future, that would not be covered by the restitution statute.  In State v.
Waidelich, the Idaho Court of Appeals held a preventative measure following the crime did not
qualify  as  a  direct  out-of-pocket  loss  or  expense,  and  so  was  not  a  proper  item  of  restitution
under Section 19-5304. Waidelich, 140 Idaho 622, 624 (Ct. App. 2004).  The defendant in
3 Ms. Peterson had testified, “[m]y husband has a 2013 Dodge GMC 3500.”  (Tr., p.98, Ls.9-10.)
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Waidelich had attempted to steal a puppy from the victim’s home. Id. at 623.  The victim
testified at the restitution hearing that after the attempted burglary, she had boarded her litter of
puppies while she was at work, because she was concerned the defendant or his accomplices
would return to steal the puppies. Id.
On appeal from the district court’s restitution order awarding the victim the cost of
boarding the puppies, the Waidelich Court concluded “the victim’s own assessment of actions
necessary to prevent future harm is not a legal basis to sustain this restitution order.” Id. at 624.
The Court of Appeals held, “[i]f such were allowed, a victim of car theft could claim restitution
for building a garage to protect his vehicle, a victim of battery could purchase a firearm, and the
burglary victim could purchase a home security system.” Id.  The Court perceived “few
boundaries on the responses which victims could have to criminal acts or on the restitution
awards that could result.” Id.  The Court explained the restitution statute “is designed to remedy
damage or loss where the injury is readily ascertainable.” Id.  As  a  preventative  measure
following the crime, the cost of boarding instead “falls under the ‘less tangible damage’ language
of the statute, and is excluded from the definition of ‘economic loss.’” Id.  The Waidelich Court
therefore vacated the restitution order for the cost of boarding the puppies. Id.
As in Waidelich, any costs here for work done on the 2013 Dodge as a preventative
measure would be excluded from the definition of ‘economic loss’ under Section 19-5304. See
id.  Thus, the invoice would not be a proper item of restitution. See id.
In sum, the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the request for restitution
on behalf of Ms. Peterson.  The State did not prove Mr. Hamann’s conduct caused the economic
losses with respect to the State Farm deductible or the Salmon River/Quality Motors invoice.
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D. The State Failed To Present Sufficient Evidence To Support The Request For Restitution
On Behalf Of State Farm
The  State  failed  to  present  sufficient  evidence  to  support  the  request  for  restitution  on
behalf of State Farm.  The State did not prove Mr. Hamann’s conduct caused the economic
losses allegedly incurred by State Farm.  As discussed above, the State failed to show the Lexus
had sustained about $1800.00 in damage (see R., p.122), including the $1700.26 that State Farm
requested for its portion.  The State also failed to show the economic losses in that amount were
the result of Mr. Hamann’s conduct. See I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(i) & (2).  Thus, there was
insufficient evidence of a causal connection between Mr. Hamann’s conduct and State Farm’s
claimed losses of $1700.26. See Wisdom, 161 Idaho at 921; Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602.  The
State did not prove Mr. Hamann’s conduct caused State Farm’s economic losses.
Because the State failed to support its requests for restitution with sufficient evidence, the
district court abused its discretion when it ordered restitution. See Wisdom, 161 Idaho at 921.
This Court should therefore reverse the district court’s civil judgments and orders of restitution
against Mr. Hamann. See State v. Wakefield, 145 Idaho 270, 274 (Ct. App. 2007).
CONCLUSION
For  the  above  reasons,  Mr.  Hamann  respectfully  requests  that  this  Court  reverse  the
district court’s civil judgments and orders of restitution against him.
DATED this 29th day of August, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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